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Abstract
Bell’s theorem contains the proposition that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) theory (hy-
pothesis) of the existence of elements of reality together with Einstein locality permits a mathe-
matical description of EPR experiments by functions that are all defined on one common prob-
ability space. This proposition leads in turn to restrictions for possible experimental outcomes
that Bell expressed in terms of his well known inequalities and that Vorob’ev and others had in-
vestigated before Bell. Summarizing several previous publications and adding new material, the
above proposition is refuted by Einstein-local counterexamples from classical physics and shown
to involve additional assumptions that can not be justified for mutually exclusive (incompati-
ble) measurements and experiments. Moreover, criticism of our work by Mermin who invoked
“standard sampling arguments” is shown to be false.
1 Introduction
It was shown in [1] that Bell’s “no-go proof”, a complex of physical and mathematical statements that
are now known as Bell’s theorem (published in [2] and extended in [3]), contains the unjustified and
incorrect assumption that all functions describing EPR experiments, even incompatible experiments,
must be definable on one common probability space, and that this assumption does not even permit
to cover all of the space of variables and functions of classical physics. It was the authors conviction
that the criticism of [1] by Mermin [4], [5] had been completely refuted, in [6], [7], [8] and [9]. In
addition, a direct logical contradiction of Bell’s assumption to the framework of classical physics
(special relativity) was demonstrated and published in [6] and [9]. Only recently was the author
informed by A. J. Leggett that it was Leggett’s believe, and that of 90 % of the experts, “that the
work of the late John Bell on what is sometimes known as “quantum non-locality” is one of the most
profound results of physics” [10] and that Mermin’s arguments in [4], [5] did, in Leggett’s opinion,
carry the day and that “he (Mermin) puts the point at least as clearly as I (Leggett) could” [11]. The
author therefore has summarized and clarified the reasoning that was presented in [6], [7], [8] and [9]
in section 3 and related this reasoning directly to Mermin’s criticism in section 4. New explanatory
material in terms of vector valued stochastic processes is also added. The author is convinced that
this present manuscript eclipses those of Mermin [4], [5] in clarity and shows that Mermin’s reasoning
is based on a lack of mathematical rigor and generality and can not be brought into correspondence
with Kolmogorov’s probability theory as well as its precise relationship to actual experiments. All
criticism of the theorem of Bell by the author and W. Philipp therefore stands and new criticism and
counterexamples are added in sections 3 and 4.
The author likes to emphasize that the schism among physicists about quantum non-locality goes
significantly beyond the opinion of a negligible minority. This fact is demonstrated by the recent work
of Gerard ’t Hooft [12]. Kerson Huang [13] writes in his elementary text: “...local gauge invariance
frees us from the last vestige of action at a distance...”. It is impossible to include references to all
relevant work, and we list in addition to the other references in this paper just [14] and [15] as further
examples.
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It also should be noted that the author subscribes fully to the teachings of both quantum and
Kolmogorov probability (as different and well proven probability frameworks) and to their well known
relationship to actual experiments (see e.g. [16]). The author has neither any criticism for these
frameworks nor for the definition of the “elements of physical reality” of the EPR paper [17] nor for
the EPR-type experiments performed by Aspect [18] and others. The author criticizes exclusively
the work of Bell as not being general enough to apply to general physics problems (quantum and/or
classical) and the work of Bell’s followers for the same reason and for actual logical and mathematical
mistakes.
2 Consistent random variables and probability spaces
Probability theory as applied to problems of science is and must be more than a mathematical game
[19]. It is therefore necessary to relate the axiomatic system of probability theory, and we concentrate
on that of Kolmogorov, in a unique logical way to the actual experiments. Probability theory becomes
then and only then a scientific tool and is sometimes called a “pre-statistics”. The unique and logical
connection of Kolmogorov probability to actual experiments is commonly given by the introduction
of a sample space denoted by upper case Greek symbols such as Ω [19]. The sample space contains
elements denoted by lower case Greek symbols such as ω that have a unique and logical relation to
experiments. As an example consider a roulette type of game that can result in even (e) or odd (o)
outcomes. Taking the “composite” experiment of obtaining two results in a row we have (see also
[19]):
Ω = {ee, eo, oe, oo} (1)
were we have used an explicit notation for the even-odd sequences that are possible. The goddess of
fortune, Tyche makes then one choice for a particular experiment, in this case a composite or “multiple
stage” experiment consisting of two trials, by choosing a point ωact of Ω and thus “crystallizing into
existence” one sample point e.g. eo which, of course, is revealed in two stages. It is obvious at this
point that in order to create a general mathematical model we must include all the sample points of
Eq.(1) and can not just leave out oo or oe without loosing the capability of our pre-statistics to make
statements about the actual experiments. When deciding on a sample space we need to remember
Fellers [20] word:“If we want to speak about experiments or observations in a theoretical way and
without ambiguity, we first must agree on the simple events representing the thinkable outcomes;
they define the idealized experiment.... By definition every indecomposable result of the (idealized)
experiment is represented by one, and only one, sample point. The aggregate of all sample points
will be called the sample space”. We consider in the following, for reasons of physical clarity, only
countable sets Ω. The collection of all subsets of Ω forms then the set F of events of probability
theory. In order to define a probability space we still need to introduce a measure P on F which
assigns to each event (subset of Ω) a real number of the interval [0, 1] with P (Ω) = 1. This assignment
needs to be done also in a fashion that is logical with respect to the science-problem to which we
apply probability theory. We then have formed a probability space (Ω, P ).
For applications of Kolmogorov’s probability theory it is desirable and advantageous to introduce
random variables to describe certain possible experimental outcomes. Random variables are functions
on a probability space and we denote them with upper case Roman letters such as X , Y as opposed
to the actual experimental outcomes for which we use lower case Roman x, y. The range of the
functions (random variables) is chosen to correspond to the range of experimental outcomes, e.g.
to the discrete (because of assumed countability) eigenvalue spectrum of certain quantum operators
that in turn correspond to some measurement equipment. For example we may denote the outcomes
of spin measurements by Aa = ±1 or Bb = ±1 and characterize the measurement equipment (e.g.
magnets) by bold faced subscripts such as a,b. Vector random variables such as described by a pair
(Aa, Bb) may also be used. The domain of the random variables is the probability space. The random
variables are only fully determined when both range and domain are given and clearly linked to the
actual experiments and the science of a given application. This opens the problem that is discussed
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extensively in this paper. Any given application will have some non-trivial restrictions on the choice
of functions, their range and their domain, and certain functions may just not be defined on the same
domain. We start to illustrate this by examples.
Consider the above roulette game and random variablesX(ω), Y (ω) that can assume the values e, o.
The pair outcomes of Eq.(1) can then also be described by the pair of random variables (X(ω), Y (ω))
and the use of and consistency of the sample space is clear as one can see by inserting a possible
actual choice of Tyche such as ωact ≡ eo with X(ωact) = e and Y (ωact) = o etc..
As a more complicated example consider a game that is not “fair” but is influenced by some hidden
magnetic substance that reacts to a magnetic machinery of which we only know some “orientation”
given by unit vectors such as a or b, influencing the first experiment of each pair and another hidden
magnetic machinery characterized by unit vectors b and c influencing the second experiment of the
pair. We now describe the outcome of the first experiment by the random variables Xa(ω), Xb(ω)
and the second by Yb(ω), Yc(ω). We still can, as we will see in the lemma of section 3, describe pair
outcomes by pairs of random variables such as (Xa(ω), Yb(ω)). However, if we try to create more
complicated composites such as (Xa(ω), Xb(ω), Yb(ω), Yc(ω)) we need to ask ourselves if the settings
are not mutually exclusive. For example, there may only be one single magnet available for the first
two experiments as well as another magnet for the second two. Then it is not clear that Tyche
will be able to find an ωact that “crystallizes” (Xa(ω
act), Xb(ω
act), Yb(ω
act), Yc(ω
act)) into existence
[19] without physical or mathematical contradictions. A particular danger to overlook this fact is
given when the experimental outcomes are characterized just by numbers e.g. X,Y = ±1 and one is
therefore tempted to perform algebraic operations such as additions, subtractions and multiplications.
One may also apply these operations to random variables. However, if no ωact exists that assigns
values to all of them, this can not necessarily be done. As we will see, it is not always certain that one
can find one common probability space on which a number of functions are defined and thus become
random variables. In order to describe different (particularly mutually exclusive) experiments without
contradiction we may have to model them by different sets of random variables and/or probability
spaces with different indecomposable elements ω, ω′ or ω′′, ... and corresponding probability measures
P, P ′, P ′′, ... of the probability spaces (Ω, P ), (Ω′, P ′) or (Ω′′, P ′′), ... respectively. This fact was
well known to Kolmogorov [21]. Bell criticized von Neumann [3] for his dealings with incompatible
experiments but proceeded to put such experiments on one common probability space. The existence
of a common probability space, however, is not guaranteed if the experiments are incompatible.
A particular problem that arises in this connection stems from the use of time t. For example, the
time in the reference frame of the measurement station that can be read on a clock does represent
a sense impression as defined by Mach and thus can be used in both classical and quantum physics.
However, time as such is not a random variable and can certainly not be defined as a function on the
probability space that might be useful for a roulette. Measurement times t1, t2, ..., tJ of a number J
of measurements can be introduced, with some caution, as possible outcomes of a random variable T
that is defined on some suitable probability space [6]. The conventional inclusion of time in probability
theory, however, is to introduce time-labels for random variables. This is done in the definition of
stochastic processes. Before we define a stochastic process we note that a given application in science
is not automatically guaranteed to have properties that can be described as a stochastic process.
A stochastic process A(t) can be regarded as a map [16]:
A : Ω× T → ℜd (2)
for a fixed t ∈ T [16]. Here ℜd is a d-dimensional vector with real components. In the cases considered
below the components assume only values of ±1 and d ≤ 4. Then, subsets of the sample space
B1, B2, ..., BJ in ℜd corresponding to the discrete times t1, t2, ..., tJ are introduced to define a joint
probability
P (B1, t1;B2, t2; ...;BJ , tJ) ≡ µ(A(t1) ∈ B1, A(t2) ∈ B2, A(tJ ) ∈ BJ ) (3)
that the process A(t) takes on some value in B1 at t1, B2 at t2,..., and some value BJ at tJ . The
A(t1), A(t2), ..., A(tJ ) are by definition all (vector) random variables on one common probability space.
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Because of this definition, each stochastic process gives rise to the above family of joint probabilities
that must satisfy the 4 Kolmogorov consistency conditions of which we only note the following two:
P (ℜd, t) = 1 (4)
stating that the probability of the sure event is normalized to one. Furthermore,
P (B1, t1;B2, t2; ...;BJ , tJ) ≥ 0 (5)
and refer the reader to [16] for the other two.
It is important to note that the combination of two or more scalar stochastic processes that
are related to incompatible experiments to form a vector stochastic process is not guaranteed to
be possible without contradictions. Assume, for example, that one stochastic process, say A(a, t)
depends also on a certain setting a and another A(b, t) on a setting b and assume that these settings
are mutually exclusive at the same discrete time, then the combined vector valued [16] stochastic
process (A(a, t), A(b, t)) can not be defined for the same sequence t1, t2, ..., tJ . The corresponding
probabilities of Eq.(5) would all correspond to impossible events and their sum is equal to zero
which contradicts Eq.(4) (see section 3.2). For any particular science application of the concept of
stochastic processes, and particularly vector valued stochastic processes, it is important to realize that
consistency of the joint probabilities is not guaranteed but a premise for Kolmogorov’s proof of the
existence of sets of random variables on one probability space [21], [9]. The functions of any particular
science application can therefore not automatically be treated as random variables.
3 Bell’s Theorem, Kolmogorov Consistency, Quantum Physics
The author has attempted to find in the literature a formulation of Bell’s Theorem that proceeds
in a scientific way by stating the precise relations to the actual experiments from the view of both
classical and quantum probability as well as the precise mathematical and physical premises and
proceeding from these to derive a demonstrable truth. The author found, in the original work of Bell
and in most subsequent work, the following sequence. Work is started with the hypothesis of Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen that “elements of physical reality...found by an appeal to results of experiments and
measurements” [17] exist and are mathematically represented by Einstein-local hidden variables.
In a first important step (i) Bell tries to show that the EPR theory leads to a description of the EPR
experiments by a number (≥ 3) of random variables on one common probability space. This, in turn,
implies the existence and consistency of the higher order (2, 3 and higher) joint probabilities that these
random variables assume certain values. It is this step that is criticized here by the demonstration that
for mutually exclusive (incompatible) experiments definition of the corresponding functions on one
common probability space can not always be guaranteed and leads to logical contradictions even for
Einstein local classical physics. EPR stated explicitly (second to last paragraph) that their elements
of reality do not require simultaneous measurability. If they are not simultaneously measurable,
they are not necessarily describable on one common probability space because no ωact needs to
exist that “crystallizes” [19] them all into existence. Incompatible experiments require, in general,
the introduction of a separate and different probability space. Their results can not necessarily be
contained in one common set of possible outcomes without logical contradictions. This in turn means
that neither the existence of all the higher order distributions nor the existence of more than two
random variables on one common probability space are guaranteed for EPR experiments.
In a second step (ii) the Bell inequalities are derived from the existence of the higher order (2,
3 and higher) distributions. This step is undoubtedly correct although it had been discussed before
Bell with its precise mathematical conditions by Vorob’ev [25]. Step (i) and (ii) lead then to the third
and final step (iii) the “impossibility proof” showing that Bell’s inequalities are incompatible with
quantum mechanical results and experimental results of quantum optics for certain combinations of
pair expectation values (each corresponding to order 2 joint probabilities). Then it is usually stated
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(see e.g. [22]) “hence no local hidden-variable theory can reproduce exactly the quantum mechanical
statistical predictions. This is Bell’s theorem”.
We note, however, that if step (i) can not be proven from the basic EPR hypothesis without
additional unjustified and unjustifiable assumptions, then the Bell inequalities do not follow from
EPR and the incompatibility of the Bell inequalities with quantum correlations for certain setting
combinations has no direct significance with respect to physical reality or Einstein locality.
The importance of the first step (i) is explicitly stated by Mermin [4], [5] and others [10]. For
example, Mermin [4] writes that the “very compelling Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument
would appear to require the existence of just those higher-order distributions...”, thus Mermin implies
that the mere hypothesis of the existence of elements of physical reality, or his “predetermined values”
of possible measurement outcomes, plus Einstein locality, does logically lead to the existence and
consistency of all higher order (2, 3 and higher) joint probabilities. We denote this requirement of
higher order (2, 3 and higher) consistency by RHOC. Leggett and Garg [23] even assert that “It
immediately follows from (A1) that...we can define...joint probability densities...” where (A1) refers
to “macroscopic realism” and the joint probability densities include higher order (2, 3...). The author
can not help suspecting that Mermin, Leggett and Garg as well as many others (see e.g. [24]) did not
realize the following: Kolmogorov’s existence proof shows only that if the higher order probability
distributions are consistent then there exist random variables on a common probability space that
reproduce these distributions and neither proves the existence of random variables nor the existence
and consistency of all the higher order distributions for any given application. The usual preamble in
mathematical work “Let (Ω, F, P ) be a Kolmogorov probability space” [21] may indeed have induced
some to think that this can be automatically done for any set of experiments and that (Ω, F, P ) can be
used as the common domain for any number of functions even if incompatible or mutually exclusive
experiments and measurements are involved. We will see that this is not the case.
As we will show below, Bell’s mathematical formulation (BMF) [2] and his parameter λ neither
prove the existence of nor the necessity to use three or more functions on one common probability
space to describe EPR experiments. Such necessity, in contrast to the mere existence of elements of
reality, would indeed impose certain limitations on the probabilities that (2, 3, 4...) or more random
variables assume certain values. This was shown already before Bell by Vorob’ev [25] and others.
We will show by general considerations and reference to classically conceived counterexamples in
this section (and by other methods in section 4) that the arguments that have led Bell and his followers
to step (i) lead to logical contradictions for mutually exclusive experiments and measurements and
that Bell’s definition of all functions on one probability space is not a necessary requirement even
for problems of classical physics. Furthermore it will be discussed in section 3.3 that step (ii) of
Bell represents a special case of the earlier classical mathematical work of Vorob’ev and others that,
ironically, also provides classical counterexamples for the first step (i).
Before we show all of this we emphasize that no actual set of experimental results (such as those
of Aspect [18]) can relate directly to all those higher order probability distributions because the
corresponding EPR experiments (with two settings on each side) are incompatible and mutually
exclusive at a given measurement time or for a given entangled pair. Thus Bell and followers did
not and could not possibly have derived the existence of some of the higher order (≥ 3) probability
distributions by any direct appeal to results of actual experiments. The experimental evidence and
the quantum theory for entangled pairs relate only to pair correlations and thus to pairs of random
variables and not to the joint probabilities that three or more random variables assume certain values.
3.1 Bell’s λ; Bell’s basic assumptions
We now turn to Bell’s mathematical definitions and assumptions [2] for spin related EPR experiments
that involve entangled pairs. As Bell, we consider spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. We use
for now Bell’s notation A(a, (·)) = ±1 in one wing and B(b, (·)) = ±1 in the second wing of the
EPR-experiment [2]. Here (·) indicates additional functional dependencies to be described below and
B(b, (·)) = −A(b, (·)) . The bold faced subscripts a and b are unit vectors of three dimensional space
5
and describe the measurement settings of the Stern Gerlach magnets. The corresponding quantum
operators are the spin matrices σa and σb [7].
Bell also has introduced a parameter λ that characterizes “elements of reality” related to the
entangled pair. Bell noted: “It is a matter of indifference in the following whether λ denotes a single
variable or a set or even a set of functions, and whether the variables are discrete or continuous”.
This has given Bell’s followers the impression that λ can be “anything”. Bell’s use of λ implies,
however, important restrictions because he assumes that λ is related to the entangled pair emanating
from a single source and that the possible spin outcomes are functions of λ. The spin outcomes
considered by Bell and his followers are usually denoted by A(a, λ), A(b, λ), A(d, λ) in station S1 and
B(b, λ), B(c, λ) in station S2 respectively with B = −A for equal settings. Thus, λ represents a
“package” sent from a source and the set of all packages forms the domain of all functions.
Bell’s next step, after introducing the parameter λ and functions A,B of λ, is the assumption of
a probability distribution ρ(λ) with ∫
ρ(λ)dλ = 1 (6)
This means that all functions are defined on the common sample space constituted by the λ’s and
because of Eq.(6) are defined one one common probability space. Bell thus describes the spin-outcomes
of incompatible (mutually exclusive) experiments and measurements by functions:
A(a, λ), A(b, λ), B(b, λ), B(c, λ) = ±1 (7)
that are all defined on the same domain and are algebraically manipulated accordingly. Furthermore,
Bell emphasizes, that because of Einstein locality λ is independent of the settings. This is indeed
guaranteed by the delayed choice experiments implemented by Aspect and others if λ describes en-
tities emanating from a source. The above represents the essence of Bell’s mathematical formulation
(BMF) and we summarize the important assertions: (α) λ may represent any Einstein local set of
elements of physical reality, (β) λ is independent of the instrument settings and the equipment is fully
characterized by a setting vector and (γ) all functions describing spin outcomes (three or more) are
defined on one common probability space even though they describe incompatible experiments. We
discuss below examples of classical physics that contradict the first two of these assertions and show
that the third is an assumption that can not be proven.
3.2 Counterexamples for BMF, RHOC
3.2.1 Generality of λ
The following counterexample is designed to show that the assumption of a general λ (assertion (α))
leads to a contradiction when step (i) is attempted for mutually exclusive experiments. Bell stated
that “...λ denotes...a single variable or a set...discrete or continuous...” The task in step (i) of the Bell
theorem is then to prove that the functions of Eq.(7) that describe the spin outcomes and are defined
on sets of arbitrary general Einstein-local elements of reality as defined by EPR (and symbolized by
λ) have consistent higher order joint distributions as for example:
P (λ : A(a, λ) = +1, A(b, λ) = +1, B(b, λ) = −1, B(c, λ) = +1). (8)
According to Bell’s statement above we may substitute for λ the set ω, tj where ω is an element
of a probability space (Ω, P ) and tj the clock time of measurement in the frame of the measurement
stations. The clock time tj is an element of reality even in the sense of Mach and therefore a fortiori in
the sense of EPR, and ω can correspond to any element of reality (also the sense of Mach) drawn from
an urn or generated by a computer. Bell’s functions form then a classical vector valued stochastic
process involving vectors:
(A(a, ω, t), A(b, ω, t), B(b, ω, t), B(c, ω, t)) (9)
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The first term of the probability distribution given in Eq.(3) and the corresponding measure µ is:
µ(A(a, ω, t1) ∈ B1, A(b, ω, t1) ∈ B1, B(b, ω, t1) ∈ B1, B(c, ω, t1) ∈ B1...) (10)
If we take now into account that Bell’s functions describe mutually exclusive experiments and mea-
surements, then we encounter a serious logical hurdle with BMF. Because the event of outcomes
with different settings in the same station to happen at the same time t1 is the impossible event and
the same is true for all the other measurement times, all the corresponding probabilities are zero
and we therefore have as mentioned before and proven in [6] in great detail the result zero for all
the joint probabilities. This, however, is in contradiction to the second consistency requirement of
Eq.(4). Therefore the higher order joint probabilities do not fulfill the consistency conditions and
(A(a, ω, t), A(b, ω, t), B(b, ω, t), B(c, ω, t)) can not be the vector of a multivariate stochastic process.
This disproves the assertion that the mere existence of elements of reality, or of corresponding
predetermined values, or of “reality at the macroscopic level” [23], [24] and use of Einstein locality
requires (RHOC) the existence and consistency of those higher order distributions. Another similar
counterexample treating the measurement times as values that random variables may assume has been
presented with even greater mathematical rigor in [6]. Furthermore, Vorob’ev [25] gives an example
from the theory of games that can also be used as a counterexample to RHOC and BMF.
The above example demonstrates that the settings of one station (e.g. a, b) and the measurement
times taken as elements in the sense of Mach can not be varied independently. If we change the
setting we must permit a change in the stations clock-time to occur. For this reason we have used in
the past a slightly different notation with the settings as a subscript to make it clear that a different
setting implies the use of a different function that represents the spin measurements. We also change
the notation in this way from now on:
A(a, (·))→ Aa((·)) (11)
with similar provisions for all other settings and the functions B.
In the next two sections we show that the assumption of one common probability space is, from
the viewpoint of applications including classical and quantum physics a big assumption indeed and
can in general not be justified. It will also be shown that the very introduction of time t gives a proof
for the lack of generality of Bell’s function space, a proof that uses only elements of reality that all can
be encountered in actual EPR experiments and that is also fully consistent with Einstein’s relativity.
3.2.2 Instrument parameters λa(t, s1)
The following represents a counterexample of assertion (β). The introduction of time t into our rea-
soning permits the construction of local instrument parameters that are (see end of section 4) not
stochastically independent. Einstein-local time and setting dependent instrument variables may exist
and reflect the physics, including unknown physical effects, of the respective measurement instru-
ments. We have described such instrument parameters in detail in [1], [6] and denote them here by
λa(t, s1), λb(t, s1), λd(t, s1) for station S1 and λb(t, s2), λc(t, s2)... for station S2 respectively where
t stands for discrete measurement times shown e.g. by clocks in the respective stations. Here s1, s2
denote some additional parameters characteristic for the backward light-cone of the measurement in
the respective station. Now we can let the functions A,B depend on these additional parameters e.g.
A = Aa(λ, λa(t, s1)). Thus the functions A,B are now functions of one more variable that does de-
pend on the setting and may be defined on a sample space different from that of Bell’s λ and therefore
also on a different probability space say, Ω′, P ′. In principle, we may also introduce different sample
spaces and different probability spaces for each given fixed measurement time as will be discussed im-
mediately. When we consider all the different incompatible measurements, all the different settings,
measurement times and possible sample spaces then we can see the enormous over-simplification that
Bell made even from a viewpoint of classical physics. We will discuss this more explicitly in the next
section and just add here two remarks.
7
Because of the importance of these station parameters we quote Marchildon [26] who has described
their physical interpretation succinctly: “Firstly, and in the spirit of quantum mechanics, neither
particle has a precise value of any of its spin components before measurement. Rather, the particles
and the instruments jointly possess information that is sufficient for deterministic values to obtain
upon measurement. Secondly, the dependence of the instrument’s random variables on some universal
time allows for a stochastic dependence of measurement results on one another...”.
Finally we note that Mermin [5] has considered our suggestion of instrument variables but imme-
diately has dropped the setting index to replace:
Aa(λ, λa(t, s1))→ Aa(λ, λ(t, s1)) (12)
This is just one of several inaccuracies that Mermin introduced. We can see the problem by considering
that in his notation:
Ab(λ, λb(t, s1))→ Ab(λ, λ(t, s1)) (13)
which now uses the same λ(t, s1) for the two different variables λa(t, s1) and λb(t, s1). We will show
in section 4 a very convincing example that the dropping of indices that label different entities is
unbecoming.
The additional instrument parameters that are, in general, different for different settings and
measurement times call also for different probability spaces that are necessary to describe them.
Considerations of generality require in fact different probability spaces for each setting pair and each
measurement time. This is explained in detail next.
3.2.3 The general function space that Bell should have admitted
Consider now the functions A,B and let us use the notation that we have introduced for stochastic
processes, noting that we do not assume here that these functions indeed are the random variables of
a stochastic process and therefore defined on a single probability space. Because the single measure-
ments in station S2 are made in essence “simultaneously” with those of station S1 for each entangled
pair, we can use the same probability space for the random variables B and A for one given setting
on each side. For any single experiment we can use the same measurement time tj for both A and
B, or also a different measurement time t′j for B just corresponding to the same entangled pair if we
wish to do so. We will in the following, for simplicity in the notation assume the same measurement
time tj for a given entangled pair but note again that our notation and everything we claim can easily
accommodate a different time t′j . The subscript of the measurement times is the same for a given
entangled pair. We need to make sure, however, that we use for different setting pairs different time
sequences. Note that we dropped for simplicity the parameters s1, s2 that need to be included, in
general, along with tj and t
′
j respectively. For setting a in station S1 and b in station S2 we use
then functions (Aa(ω
1, t1), Aa(ω
2, t2), ..., Aa(ω
J , tJ)) and (Bb(ω
1, t1), Bb(ω
2, t2), ..., Bb(ω
J , tJ)) re-
spectively. We introduce additional functions (Ab(ω
J+1, tJ+1), Ab(ω
J+2, tJ+2), ..., Ab(ω
2J , t2J)) and
corresponding functions (Bc(ω
J+1, tJ+1), Bc(ω
J+2, tJ+2), ..., Bc(ω
2J , t2J )). We also need to introduce
another function set (Aa(ω
2J+1, t2J+1), Aa(ω
2J+2, t2J+2), ..., Aa(ω
3J , t3J)) and, to complete the cor-
respondence to Bell, the set (Bc(ω
2J+1, t2J+1), Bc(ω
2J+2, t2J+2), ..., Bc(ω
3J , t3J)). In this way we
have generated a very general system of functions on very general domains. Note that we admit
3J different probability spaces (Ω1, P 1), (Ω2, P 2)..., (Ω3J , P 3J). This means that we use the elements
of a different sample space for each different time index (and, in general, also for each different s1
and s2). We call this general set of functions and probability spaces the generalized EPR set and
denote it by GEPRS. The question whether any subset of the GEPRS set or of products such as
Aa(ω
j , tj)Bb(ω
j , tj) with j = 1, ..., J or Aa(ω
i, ti)Bb(ω
i, ti) with i = J + 1, , 2J etc. can be defined
on a common probability space and therefore forms a stochastic process is, as we saw above and will
further demonstrate below, a question that has no trivial answer and needs to be checked for any
particular application. It is certain (see next section) that the full GEPRS set can not always be
defined on one common probability space and can therefore not always be regarded to form a (vector)
stochastic process.
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3.3 Bell, Vorob’ev, quantum mechanics, cyclicity
This section is not entirely self contained and the reader is referred to the detailed proofs of [6].
We just wish to emphasize the following. The contradiction that Bell obtained is not rooted in the
specific quantum mechanical pair expectation values and their experimental confirmation but in the
additional requirement that three or more functions are defined on the same common probability
space even though they describe incompatible experiments. This additional requirement can only be
met if the higher order distributions such as the probability that the three (or more) random variables
assume certain values are consistent with the joint pair distributions. The existence and consistency
of these higher order (≥ 3) distributions is not required by quantum mechanics that does not deal
with random variables. As we have seen, it is also not required and can not be met for certain
classical vector valued stochastic processes that involve mutually exclusive experiments. EPR have
not required the existence and consistency of the higher order (≥ 3) distributions because they did
expressly consider elements of physical reality that can not be measured simultaneously. According
to Vorob’ev’s work, the additional requirement results in mathematical constraints even for sets of
pair probability distributions if they exhibit a topological-combinatorial “cyclicity” [25].
It will be shown below by using Vorob’ev’s classical line of reasoning that, if we consider the
functions of section 3.2, we may concatenate the 3J admissible different probability spaces for the
3J function pairs to form 3 mutually exclusive function pairs with each different pair defined on a
different abstract probability space. However, a contradiction may arise if one attempts to further
concatenate the pairs corresponding to mutually exclusive experiments and to describe them on a
single common probability space. We first prove that no contradiction arises if compatible (i.e. not
mutually exclusive) EPR experiments are concatenated on one probability space. We use, as Bell did,
the relation Ba(ω) = −Aa(ω) just for the sake of an efficient presentation.
Lemma: For one given setting in each of the two stations, and thus for a given set of compatible
experiments, it is possible to disregard the different measurement times (tj , ti, etc.) of the previous
section, and to find a single abstract probability space on which the functions A,B = ±1 of GEPRS
can be defined while still obtaining the pair expectation value prescribed by quantum mechanics.
Proof:
The goal is to obtain the pair expectation value M(Aa(ω)Bb(ω)) = −M(Aa(ω)Ab(ω)) prescribed
by quantum mechanics [2], [22]:
M(Aa(ω)Ab(ω)) = −〈ψB|σa ⊗ σb|ψB〉 = a · b (14)
where ⊗ denotes the tensor product and |ψB〉 is the Bell wave function:
|ψB >= 1√
2
((
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
−
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
))
. (15)
The following joint probability measure results in M(Aa(ω)Ab(ω)) of Eq.(14) as can be found by
inspection (see [7], [9]):
P (ω : Aa(ω) = (−1)n, Ab(ω) = (−1)k) = 1
4
(1 + (−1)n+ka · b) (16)
Here k, n = 1, 2. The probability measure so defined also fulfills M(Aa(ω)) = M(Ab(ω)) = 0 as
required by quantum mechanics [6]. Thus, EPR spin experiments as discussed by Bell and restricted
to precisely one setting on each side, i.e. to compatible experiments, can be described by one abstract
probability space with elements ω ∈ Ω that represent both source and equipment variables. We have
for all probabilities 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 and no contradiction of the Bell type occurs. We have also shown
previously that the above random variables and abstract probability space can be simulated by use
of a classical computer [7] and have also given an elaborate Einstein-local mathematical model that
includes the setting and time dependent equipment parameters [27].
Before we proceed, we recall that the elements of the GEPRS set are functions on numerous
domains that can at least, in principle, not necessarily be defined on one probability space. To single
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out the setting pair as the only indication for differences in the functions is an arbitrary choice such
as the choice of the color of a shirt to characterize a person. It is therefore not a trivial fact that all
the possible domains can be replaced by one common probability space. It is also not trivial that,
as shown in the lemma, one can disregard the functional dependencies on the measurement times
(tj , ti etc.) and still recover some of the major results of quantum physics. We will see, however,
that this is not always possible when incompatible experiments are involved. We show also that the
“impossibility” that Bell actually found does not arise from the mere fact that we wish to obtain
certain pair expectation values such as a ·b but necessitates the additional requirements that three or
more functions describing incompatible composite (multi stage) experiments are defined on a single
common probability space. These facts follow from the detailed proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1:
Consider functions Aa, Ab, Bb, Bc = ±1 with Ab = −Bb etc.. Consider further three or more pair
products of these functions and all expectation values that can be obtained for these pair products
by use of a different probability space for each different pair. It is then in general impossible to find
a single common probability space (Ω, P ) that reproduces all these expectation values for the pair
products. The reason for this impossibility can always be traced (also for functions with a more
general range) to a combinatorial-topological cyclicity inherent in the set of the pair products and
defined by Vorob’ev [25]. Expectation values from quantum mechanics such as a · b, a · c and b · c
corresponding to the cyclical products AaAb, AaAc and AbAc respectively can, for certain settings
a,b, c, serve as an example.
Proof:
We present only an outline of the major ideas of the proof with references to previous work
that contain the precise and complete elements of the proof as well as the complete solution of the
consistency problem.
It was shown in [6] that Bell’s inequalities represent a special case of the more general mathematical
framework of Vorob’ev [25]who showed that ”..it is not always possible to construct a vector random
variable with given consistent projections.” Vorob’ev’s [25] work gives precise mathematical conditions
for the validity of his statements and theorems and the serious reader should at least understand
Theorem 1 of [6] and the first page of [25]. However, the essence is this:
The pairs of random variables Aa(ω)Ab(ω), Aa(ω)Ac(ω) and Ab(ω)Ac(ω) form a “closed loop”
or display a “cyclic behavior” [25]. Then, once the pair distributions of Aa(ω)Ab(ω) and Aa(ω)Ac(ω)
are given one can not choose that of Ab(ω)Ac(ω) with complete freedom and at the same time require
that Aa(ω), Ab(ω), Ac(ω) are all random variables defined on one common probability space.
In terms of the algebra of random variables one finds the well known constraints on the possible
outcomes for four setting pairs (see section 4 for details):
Γ = Aa(ω)Bb(ω) +Aa(ω)Bc(ω) +Ad(ω)Bb(ω)−Ad(ω)Bc(ω) = ±2 (17)
which leads to the Bell-type inequality Γ ≤ 2. Thus the range (codomain) of the function Γ, which
plays a very significant role in the framework of Bell, is restricted to ±2 because of the assumption
of a single domain for the cyclically arranged functions. Without the requirement of one domain,
that has no basis for incompatible experiments, the range of Γ would be ±4. The use of the pair
expectation values suggested by Eq.(14) is possible according to the lemma for any single setting
pair and the involved functions Aa(ω)Ab(ω) can be defined on one probability space. We can also
obtain the quantum result for the pair expectation of Aa(ω
′)Ac(ω
′) by using a different probability
space (Ω′, P ′) etc.. However we can not require for any physical or mathematical reason that all three
(or four) functions Aa((·)), Ab((·)), Ac((·)) etc. must always be defined on one common probability
space. If they are not, then Eq.(17) makes no mathematical sense. The constraint on the range of Γ
is therefore not required by the physics of the problem but only by the desire to use more than two
random variables and one domain (probability space) to model that physics.
In summary we have found that the existence and consistency of all higher order distributions
has been correctly disproved by Bell in his step (iii) for cyclically arranged functions describing
incompatible spin related EPR experiments. However, the existence and consistency of third order
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joint probabilities is neither required by experiment nor by quantum theory and was only assumed by
Bell without justification. Furthermore, Bell also could have already disproved the general validity
of step (i) by using the example of a classical vector valued stochastic process or Vorob’ev’s classical
reasoning and his example from the theory of games. But then Bell would have disproved altogether
that step (i) must follow from the mere hypothesis of existing elements of reality and Einstein locality.
If step (i) is disproved in that way, then the third step (iii) looses its connection to EPR. Because
the higher order (≥ 3) distributions have also no connection to actual experiments, Bell’s inequalities
have therefore the following meaning. Composite functions such as Γ that are created by a cyclical
arrangement of other functions exhibit a constraint on their possible range (co-domain). Certain
ranges can not be achieved by use of one domain only. Incompatible experiments may have to be
defined by their very nature on different domains and Γ may therefore not lend itself to describe
incompatible experiments by use of one domain without contradiction.
4 Variations on Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) by Mer-
min, Leggett and Peres
The Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt [28] no-go proof has been discussed extensively in the literature.
While their original work still contains the parameter λ and uses Bell’s assumptions that imply
one common probability space, textbooks such as [29] and [30] present proofs that do not include
any explicit reference to λ. In spite of rigorous mathematical discussions in the literature [14], it
is therefore often believed that at least these proofs require “only the existence of predetermined
values...independent of the local mechanism that produces them” [5] and thus show that the EPR
hypothesis by itself results in a constraint on the collection of actual outcomes. Some even believe
that these proofs relate directly to experimental data and represent therefore a proof of the area of
statistics. We show in this section (theorem 2) that the expression for the hypothetical predetermined
values that is used in the texts by Leggett [30], Peres [29] and others as well as in the publications
of Mermin [4], [5] does not relate directly to the actual experimental data and therefore can also
not be used to construct the sample space of Kolmogorov’s probability theory. Any scientifically
serious pre-statistics (probability theory) needs a sample space related in a clear and direct way to
the actual experiments. It follows then, that CHSH and the variations of Mermin, Leggett and Peres
are either just a reformulation of Bell’s work who attempted to describe the actual experiments by
using functions defined on one common probability space, or follow from the unjustifiable assumption
of conditional stochastic independence as discussed at the end of this section.
To show all of this we start from the actual experimental results. We use the notation for spin 1/2
related experiments in order to relate directly to Bell’s work. However, all that is claimed and used
here with respect to the experiments is also valid for actual optical experiments, such as the celebrated
Aspect experiment. Consider then experiments taken with equal probability of P = 1/4 for magnet
(or Kerr cell etc.) setting pairs (a,b), (a, c), (d,b) and (d, c) respectively as proposed by CHSH.
We denote the actual experimental outcomes by the lower case symbols aa, ad in one wing of the
experiment and bb, bc in the other with the subscripts indicating the magnet settings in the respective
stations. We also add integer indices j = 1, ..., J ; i = J +1, ..., 2J ; l = 2J +1, ..., 3J ; s = 3J + 1, ..., 4J
that enumerate the collected experimental data using j for setting pairs a,b, i for a, c, l for d,b and
s for d, c respectively; J being just a large number. In this way we can represent all experimental
sequences and their addition/subtraction as performed by CHSH by using about J expressions of the
form:
γj,i,l,sexp =: a
j
a · bjb + aia · bic + ald · blb − asd · bsc. (18)
The equality of the superscript in the products of Eq.(18) pays attention to the fact that the exper-
iments in the two wings correspond to the same entangled pair. We have introduced, for the sake
of generality, different superscripts that indicate different entangled pairs as well as the possibility of
different instrument variables.
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It is important to note that γj,i,l,sexp can assume the values:
γj,i,l,sexp = 0,±2,±4 (19)
This follows from the fact that the actual experimental results can only assume values of ±1 for each
of the factors of Eq.(18). The expectation value M(γj,i,l,sexp ) of γ
j,i,l,s
exp for the J quadruple experiments
can then be calculated from:
M(γj,i,l,sexp ) =
1
J
[
J∑
j=1
aj
a
· bj
b
+
2J∑
i=J+1
ai
a
· bi
c
+
3J∑
l=2J+1
al
d
· bl
b
−
4J∑
s=3J+1
as
d
· bs
b
] (20)
We know from actual experiments of the Aspect type that for a specific choice of setting pairs we
have:
M(γj,i,l,sexp ) = 2 + δ (21)
where the experimentally found δ may be as much as about 0.8 (Mermin speaks about 40 % above
the value 2 [5]) which also agrees with quantum theory that results in a supremum of 2
√
2 for M. We
therefore can state the following theorem:
Theorem2 :
The actual experimental results for the composite γj,i,l,sexp that are obtained from J experimental
quadruples and are used to calculate the expectation value M by using Eq.(20) and result in Eq.(21)
must contain about R terms having values of γj,i,l,sexp = 4 with R ≥ Jδ2 .
Proof (by contradiction):
Assume that the results of J (quadruple-composite) experiments contain the value γj,i,l,sexp = 4 only
in numbersR < Jδ
2
. We know that we can only encounter the experimental values of γj,i,l,sexp = 0,±2,±4
and that therefore
M(γj,i,l,sexp ) =
1
J
(−4O − 2P + 2Q+ 4R) (22)
where O,P,Q,R are positive integers that indicate the occurrences of the values −4,−2, 2, 4 respec-
tively. We also may have S occurrences of the value zero and therefore have O+P +Q+R+S = J .
From Eq.(22) and the assumption of R < Jδ
2
we have:
M(γj,i,l,sexp ) ≤
1
J
(+2Q+ 4R) ≤ 2 + 2R
J
< 2 + δ (23)
which contradicts the experimental result of Eq.(21) and thus completes the proof.
Mermin, Leggett, Peres and others do not deal with the actual experimental values of γj,i,l,sexp as
defined above and do not present a proof of the area of statistics. Instead they use a very different
quadruple γj [5]:
γj = aj
a
· bj
b
+ aj
a
· bj
c
+ aj
d
· bj
b
− aj
d
· bj
c
(24)
As one can easily see we have:
γj = ±2with j = 1, ..., J (25)
γj clearly has no relation to the actual experiments because the experimental values represented by
γj,i,l,sexp must, according to theorem 2 also assume +4 with statistical significance. Therefore γ
j can
also not have anything to do with the sample space of Kolmogorov’s probability theory or a sample
space of any equivalent reasonable pre-statistics. To use γj = ±2 compares to the attempt to model a
game with a possible outcome of 5 different numbers by using only two numbers in the mathematical
model of the game. Or, in terms of the even-odd pairs of section 2, one just can not explain the
experiment and leave out e.g. the combinations eo, oo.
Thus, the use of the quadruples γj = ±2 that are not directly linked to experiments requires
additional justification. One needs to take a first step, corresponding to (i) in section 3, that leads
from the EPR hypothesis of elements of reality to the necessity of using γj = ±2. Leggett and
Peres use as a basis a counterfactual argument that they believe to be justified if the counterfactual
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EPR reasoning is taken to be justified. We have discussed this extensively in [1], [6] and have shown
that Leggett and Peres add an incorrect assumption to EPR’s valid counterfactual reasoning. We
summarize these previous findings below for completeness but first describe Mermin’s [5] equally false
justification of using γj = ±2.
Mermin writes “We wish to test the postulate that the result ax(j) = ±1...for measurements of
the jth pair along any direction x is predetermined...by hidden variables for all possible x...” where x
stands for the possible settings of Eq.(24). Formulated like this, Mermin’s “postulate” is not general
and does, in general, not follow from the EPR hypothesis because it links the index j exclusively to
the entangled pair (just as Bell did with λ) and disregards possible elements of reality related to the
instruments and their settings. As we have seen in section 3, a general approach must also admit
setting dependent instrument variables. We also know from section three that the factors of γj can
not necessarily be regarded as values that random variables defined on one probability space assume.
Disregarding all the problems related to the sample space of a valid pre-statistics, Mermin proceeds to
“average uniformly over all...pairs”, 4J in our notation, to obtain an expectation value of the following
entity (that neither has any well defined connection to the actual experiments nor to a corresponding
general set of EPR’s elements of reality):
M(γj) =
1
4J
[
4J∑
j=1
aj
a
· bj
b
+
4J∑
j=1
aj
a
· bj
c
+
4J∑
j=1
aj
d
· bj
b
−
4J∑
j=1
aj
d
· bj
c
] (26)
Now Mermin claims that by “standard sampling arguments” (a) each sum in Eq.(26) will be very
close to the corresponding sum of Eq.(20) and (b) that at the same timeM(γj) ≤ 2. Mermin does not
give any literature reference for this “standard sampling argument” and only explains that because of
the random choice of setting the “indices j... constitute a random sample of the full set of indices...”
which is “surely what Asher (Peres), who has a well known distaste for being explicit about what
should be obvious [5], had in mind...”. Because of the fact that in general the indices represent not only
the entangled pairs but also instrument variables, this statement is false: the instrument variables
can not be sampled randomly. There are in Eq.(20) 4J entangled pairs but only J corresponding
pairs of instrument variables that are encountered for each of the 4 given setting pairs. These pairs
of instrument variables are, in general, different for different setting pairs. The instrument variables
λa, λb may even have nothing at all in common with λd, λc. Nevertheless, Mermin’s claim (a) that
each sum in Eq.(20) will be very close to the corresponding sum of Eq.(26) is true (under certain
mathematical conditions [19]) even if we involve instrument variables. We know from the lemma
in section 3, that the functions of section 3.2 that involve only one pair of settings and therefore
correspond to compatible experiments can be concatenated on one abstract probability space. In
other words we can represent products of e.g. the functions (Aa(ω
1, t1), Aa(ω
2, t2), ..., Aa(ω
J , tJ))
and (Bb(ω
1, t1), Bb(ω
2, t2), ..., Bb(ω
J , tJ)) by products Aa(ωabs)Bb(ωabs). We have added here the
subscript abs to emphasize that we are dealing with an abstract probability space that arises from
a concatenation of many sample and probability spaces that in turn are related to the different
elements of reality in the instruments. For the functions involving the other setting pairs we have
then, in general different sample/probability spaces e.g. Aa(ω
′
abs)Bc(ω
′
abs), Ad(ω
′′
abs)Bb(ω
′′
abs) and
Ad(ω
′′′
abs)Bc(ω
′′′
abs) respectively. Note that now Mermin’s claim (b) is false because the sum of the
products of “results”
Aa(ωabs)Bb(ωabs) +Aa(ω
′
abs)Bc(ω
′
abs) +Ad(ω
′′
abs)Bb(ω
′′
abs)−Ad(ω′′′abs)Bc(ω′′′abs) (27)
does not make any mathematical sense particularly owing to theorem 1. Only if we can find a unified
new abstract probability space, say with elements ωuniabs do we have a justification for the algebra of
random variables and obtain:
Aa(ω
uni
abs )Bb(ω
uni
abs ) +Aa(ω
uni
abs )Bc(ω
uni
abs ) +Ad(ω
uni
abs )Bb(ω
uni
abs )−Ad(ωuniabs )Bc(ωuniabs ) = ±2 (28)
as well as M(γj) ≤ 2. The problem with Eq.(26) is that Mermin’s “results” in the different sums of
the equation deserve from the start all different indices because they may all correspond, at least in
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general, to different instrument variables as well as different source variables and we may therefore
not conclude that:
M(γj) =
1
4J
4J∑
j=1
[aja · bjb + aja · bjc + ajd · bjb − ajd · bjc] ≤ 2 (29)
The mathematically unbecoming practice of Mermin to equate or disregard indices for objects with
different origins and meaning has led here to misconceptions and puzzlement. To put it simple:
the components of the different sums are even from a completely classical view (without quantum
non-locality) like apples and oranges. All the parts of any given sum are just of one kind and can
be operated on with standard sampling arguments. However, one can not mix the elements of the
different sums because these are arising from incompatible experiments. We know that we can not
necessarily add elements of different sets and therefore also not necessarily functions on sets that
differ in their very nature. Naturally, we do not know the precise nature of EPR’s elements of reality
and can not necessarily add functions of λa, λb and functions of the possibly completely different
λd, λc. Kolmogorov’s probability theory has some flexibility: as long as at least an abstract common
Kolmogorov space can be found, we can do algebra with the functions on that space; but such common
abstract space can not always be found. Only under certain conditions can we combine or concatenate
different Kolmogorov spaces of incompatible experiments. However, for the particular case we consider
here the enforcement of one common domain actually changes the range (the codomain) of functions
such as γj,i,l,sexp which in turn makes a transition to a different sample space. Naturally that leads to
contradictions. The author is very sympathetic with anybodies “...distaste for being explicit about
what should be obvious” [5]. He is also aware, however, that the great theorems of mathematics and
science have not been proven by apotheosis but by Weierstrassian generality and rigor and sometimes
tedium. The Bell theorem and the variations by Bell’s followers have not been proven with rigor and
generality but often by using simplistic examples that remind the author of the many short “proofs”
of Fermat’s theorem that have falsely claimed to be general. The following is included to highlight
this point.
We have shown in [31] that the extended counterfactual reasoning that Leggett and others have
used to validate Eq.(24) is based on faulty logic. They justify the appearance of different settings
with labels signifying the same entangled pair by the fact that for that given pair one could have
chosen different settings. One may indeed assume, as EPR did, that one could have chosen a different
setting in a given station to perform the measurement, but one can not assume, as Leggett and Peres
do, but EPR did definitely not, that all these possible results that could have been found if different
settings were chosen are then somehow found in the actual data and can be used as elements of a
sample space. One can assume that one could have picked different items from different menus in
different restaurants but it is ridiculous to assume that one has therefore eaten them all simultaneously.
There simply exist classical experiments that are mutually exclusive as is the appearance of certain
measurement outcomes in the actual data. Peres did acknowledge the dangers of counterfactual
arguments by stating that “unperformed experiments have no results”. However, this statement of
Peres is extremely misleading because, taken at face value, it forbids the use of probability theory
altogether: Kolmogorov’s probability theory uses the expression P (F ) for the probability that an
event F will occur for an experiment yet to be performed [19].
Perhaps it is instructive to consider measurements with one given setting pair only. Then one
could have measured a quadruple with the same setting and therefore
γ′ = aj
a
· bj
b
+ aj
a
· bj
b
+ aj
a
· bj
b
+ aj
a
· bj
b
= ±4 (30)
However, such γ′ that also can be generated by the Leggett/Peres counterfactual argument does not
necessarily describe the actual experimental outcomes in an adequate way. Consider, for example, a
classical stochastic process with time dependent A,B. What does γ′ = ±4 then mean? We could also
have chosen an n-tuple of aj
a
·bj
b
and argued that this leads to the result ±n in Eq.(30) which depending
on the number n deviates by arbitrary large amounts from the actual sum of n experimental results
that may have an arbitrary time dependence!
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If, however, to save the day for Eq.(24) Bell’s λ, and cyclically arranged functions of λ are invoked,
then we are back full circle to the arguments of Bell and to our discussion and refutation presented
in section 3. What does then Eq.(24) really mean? For this author it is only proof for how far-
reaching Bell’s assumptions of one common probability space together with the cyclicity of the involved
functions really are. From the above description with indices or, a fortiori, with measurement times
tj , ti, tl, ts it can be seen that Eq.(24) and Eq.(18) imply J equalities of the form a
j
a
= ai
a
, bi
c
= bs
c
etc., with J being a very large integer or even considering the limit J →∞.
That leaves only (conditional) independence arguments to possibly justify Mermin’s and Leggetts
line of reasoning. These arguments are also neither obvious nor general and are discussed here last.
Bell’s demonstration and Mermin’s reiteration of [5] (conditional) stochastic independence of the two
measurement stations S1, S2, or the townships of Lille and Lyons in Bell’s example, suffers from the
problem that it is either not general or, if taken as general, then it is an assumption not a proof. Bell
claims that the probabilities, taken conditional to λ, that Aa((·)) in station S1 and Bb((·)) in station
S2 assume certain values obey [32]
P (Aa((·)), Bb((·))|λ) = P1(Aa((·))|λ)P2(Bb((·))|λ) (31)
Here (·) indicates functional dependencies on λ and additional variables such as the instrument pa-
rameters described in section 3.2. If we take the view that λ can be anything (and this is actually
what Bell seems to do when discussing Lille and Lyons) then the probabilities that A,B take on
certain values are independent by definition. Relating to the EPR experiment that we consider, it
is inconceivable to the author that one can make all classical physics processes in Lille and Lyons
stochastically independent by conditioning the probabilities on some “parameter” λ that is being sent
from some source. Why should all the clocks of the two cities, even if set by many different and
partly confused persons and even if they are fast or slow, be stochastically independent conditional to
some entities that are sent to the cities? Does Bell wish to tell us that all classical physics processes
in arbitrary cities can be seen as stochastically independent conditionally to λ and only quantum
non-locality will lead to exceptions? All of this just shows that one can not proof theorems in such
colloquial terms. One needs to agree on the use of a respected mathematical framework. If we agree
to use Kolmogorov probability then the conditioning of the probabilities must refer to events (subsets)
of one common sample space and we must use in our considerations one common probability space
[19]. Of course, this returns us to the (often impossible; also classically impossible!) assumption of
one common probability space for a large number of functions that originally are defined on a large
number of different domains and correspond to incompatible experiments.
5 Conclusion
The author has shown that Bell’s theorem and the no-go variations of CHSH, Leggett, Mermin, Peres
and others are based on the use of one common probability space that can not be justified for problems
of physics, classical and/or quantum when incompatible experiments are involved. The combination
of Bell inequalities and the results of Aspect type experiments does therefore not disprove the EPR
hypothesis of the existence of elements of reality plus Einstein locality. Furthermore, the variations on
Bell by Peres, Leggett and Mermin have been shown to neither relate to the actual experiments nor
to a valid pre-statistics (Kolmogorov’s probability theory which has a logical, clear and well defined
relation to the actual experiments) and suffer otherwise from the same problems as Bell’s theorem.
The author challenges his NAS-colleagues to present a logically rigorous and scientifically acceptable
proof for the “theorem of Bell” that encompasses all its necessary steps and uses a valid pre-statistics
with accepted relations to the actual experiments. The author conjectures from the above discussion
that the only thing that is really impossible here is to present such a scientific proof.
Acknowledgement: The author wishes to thank Louis Marchildon and Peter Morgan for many
valuable suggestions to improve the manuscript.
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